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 Abstract 
The paper analyzes the radical right‘s attitudes toward the EU focusing in particular on the 
level of congruence between the programmatic statements of the central office and the 
voting behavior of their MEPs. It shows that although radical right parties represent a source 
of opposition to the EU, within the EP they express their dissent making use of the rules of 
the game, voting with the opposition more than the other forces do, but voting almost as 
much with the majority. The party public office in the EP is inserted in the legislative process 
and even more collusive with the other parties of both sides of the political spectrum than the 
Eurosceptical rhetoric and statements of central office makes the public believe. 
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I.  Introduction 
Many studies show that Euroscepticism has become an ideological pillar of radical right 
parties. It is a theme that has acquired greater salience within the political discourse of this 
area, to the point that these parties have become the main stronghold of EU-pessimism 
(Mudde 2007). Particularly, their political discourse has largely internalized the EU issue, 
making the radical right the political area where this issue has become more salient (Kriesi 
2007). In this paper, I analyze the radical right‘s attitudes toward the EU focusing in particular 
on the level of congruence between the programmatic statements and the voting behavior of 
their MEPs. Notably, the aim of the paper is to describe the problem along the following 
lines: 
1) an analysis of the level of congruence of party positions within the programmatic 
supply of these parties, as well as within the voting behavior of their MEPs; 
2) an analysis of the level of congruence between the political discourse of the party 
central office and the voting behavior of the party in public office. 
 
It is an approach that aims at integrating several dimensions of party attitudes toward the EU 
examined by earlier studies, such as the dimension of the political discourse that was 
examined through the party manifestos for the European elections (Gabel & Hix 2004), and 
of the institutional behavior of politicians that was examined through the voting behavior of 
MEPs (Hix et al. 2007). In sum, through the analysis of party Euromanifestos and roll-call 
votes in the European Parliament, I will produce a description of what radical right parties 
say about Europe, what their MEPs do in order to translate the party rhetoric into concrete 
political action, and how congruent these two dimensions of the party stance on the EU are. 
From the theoretical point of view, the paper will contribute to understanding politics and the 
behavior of the radical right in different ways. Firstly, the results of the comparative analysis 
will allow us to determine whether the radical right behaves cohesively enough to present the 
character of a real party family. Or, alternatively, it will determine whether the empirical 
evidence supports the argument – maintained by the founder of the German Republicans 
Franz Schönhuber  among others (in Mudde 2007: 159) – that a genuine European radical 
right does not really exist. 
Secondly, assessing the level of congruence between the attitudes of different faces of party 
organization is a relevant problem that current research has just started to address (Conti, Cotta & 
Tavares de Almeida 2010). Particularly, assessing the extent to which the official party stance on the 
EU overlaps with that of party officials holding public office is meaningful for a comprehensive 
understanding of the broad phenomenon of party attitudes toward the EU. Recent research shows that 
citizens are way less pro-European than politicians (Best, Lengyel & Verzichelli forthcoming). Given the 
gap in the support for the EU between citizens and politicians, it is particularly relevant to study 
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whether the party central office pools together with the party in public office or whether it takes more 
cautious positions. In other words, does the stance of the MEPs within the European Parliament (EP) 
reflect the party discourse on the EU developed for usage in the electoral market? The comparison 
between the attitudes of the party central office and those of the MEPs presented in this paper will 
allow us to answer this question. 
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II.  The Contents of Euroscepticism: What the Radical 
Right Says About the EU 
In order to analyze the attitudes of radical right parties toward the EU and to describe the 
main components of these attitudes (dissatisfaction with the defense of national interests, 
opposition to EU policies, protest against loss of sovereignty) I will examine the party 
positions on a set of specific issues. I will start my analysis with a study of party 
Euromanifestos, the programs that the national parties present for the EP elections. These 
documents provide a useful representation of the ideological structure and of the policy 
preferences of parties. Radical parties tend to have a particularly good electoral performance 
at the EP elections given the second-order nature of the scrutiny, and thanks to the PR 
nature of the electoral system. Their visibility in these elections tends to be high and their 
programmatic assertiveness is consequently also high. It is important to note that 
Euromanifestos are usually issued by the party central office and they present the overall 
party line for use with the party rank and file and with the electorate. Thus, these documents 
reflect a unitary vision of the party and do not offer much evidence of any eventual intra-party 
division. This limitation that is intrinsic to any manifesto analysis is also the starting point for 
an interesting research question: Is a party cohesive enough in its stance on the EU? As was 
mentioned in the introduction, this paper begins to address the problem by means of a 
comparison between the analysis of party manifestos that I present in this section, and that 
of the voting behavior of the MEPs in the following section. 
Given the level of complexity and the increasing number of policy areas where the EU is involved, it 
seems useful to break-down party attitudes across many aspects of European integration. This attempt 
allows for a disentanglement of party attitudes across different dimensions of the EU process and a 
determination whether the same stance is confirmed across such dimensions. For this purpose, I will 
focus the analysis in particular on the dimensions of representation and policy. It is a research strategy 
that aims at including several functional aspects of supranational integration in the analysis. In the 
recent past, the theoretical debate (Bartolini 2007; Benhabib 2002; Cotta e Isernia 2009) as well as 
some empirical studies (Conti & Memoli 2010; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2004; Hubé & Rambour 2010; 
Gabel & Hix 2004) have defined these dimensions as relevant for the analysis of the EU impact on 
member states and of the response of political actors to such an impact. 
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Table 1 – The coding scheme: dimensions, themes and positions in the analysis 
Dimension Theme Position (short) 
 
Position (extended) 
Represen-
tation 
Membership Favourable 
opportunities 
Europe has mainly brought benefits 
and improvements to the country. 
European integration has mainly 
produced good results for the 
country. Agreement and consensus 
towards European processes are 
expressed 
 
  Negative constraints Europe has mainly been limiting and 
constraining the country without 
brining positive results. Discontent is 
expressed towards European 
integration processes 
 
  Mixed Features of both categories 
 
  No reference Lack of reference to the theme 
 
 National action in 
the EU 
Leadership A desire to influence, guide and 
direct European processes and major 
decisions dominates. Willingness to 
be at the forefront of bargaining and 
decision-making and not to stand on 
the sidelines 
 
  Cooperation 
 
Predominantly pledges in favour of 
working together to achieve a 
common aim, even taking an active 
part in Europe decision-making 
 
  Defense/rejection Preference for opting-out/withdrawing 
the EU or some of its building-block 
policies (eg. Monetary Union, 
Common Market). Strong protection 
of national interest(s) seen as 
threatened by the EU 
 
  Mixed Any two or more categories 
 
  No reference Lack of reference to the theme 
 
Policy 
 
Foreign policy 
Defense policy 
Immigration pol. 
Supranational only 
National only 
Sub-national only 
Supranat. + national 
Supranat. + sub-nat. 
Supra. + nat. + sub-
nat. 
National + sub-nat. 
No reference 
For each policy area the favourite 
level of competence was coded. 
Combinations of different levels were 
coded only when explicitly 
mentioned. 
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The data base used for this part of the analysis was created by the IntUne project.
1
 A group 
of national experts coded 298 Euromanifestos
2
 of all political areas in fifteen member states.
3
 
Although these documents refer to the 1979-2004 period, the large majority actually refer to 
1994-2004.
4
 One could claim that parties may have changed their attitudes over this period. 
In fact, this does not seem to be the case for radical parties, as the empirical analysis has 
already shown that a change in the attitudes toward the EU can be found mainly in the 
moderate parties (Gabel & Hix 2004). On the contrary, radical parties are not inclined to 
change their attitudes on the EU, they tend instead to be rather stable in their opposition 
(Szcerbiack & Taggart 2003, 2008) that, over time, has only become more salient, especially 
in the case of the radical right (Kriesi 2007). We expect, therefore, variations across time to 
be quite limited in scope, but I will report them anyway when they are deemed relevant. 
The analysis starts with an examination of the level of occurrence of the selected themes 
within the Euromanifestos. In table 2, we find evidence of the fact that, in their documents 
radical parties generally refer to such themes as often as (or even more often than) 
mainstream parties do. Certainly, the table does not contain any information about the 
direction of the positions expressed on the specific issues in the documents. However, it was 
relevant to find confirmation that the analyzed themes do play an important role in the party 
discourse on the EU. They are important components of the party stance on the EU. 
Although  across parties some differences can be found in terms of frequency of occurrence, 
overall, the selected themes recurred frequently in the Euromanifestos (in between 51.7 and 
88.8 per cent of Euromanifestos, depending on the theme). Hence, we can be confident that 
they represent good empirical referents for the analysis of party attitudes toward the EU as 
they really structured the programmatic supply provided in the Euromanifestos. 
                                                     
1
 INTUNE (Integrated and United: A quest for Citizenship in an an ever closer Europe), an Integrated Project 
financed by the VI Framework Programme of the European Union (CIT3-CT-2005-513421). The research in this 
paper was also supported by the Italian National project ―Il processo di integrazione europea in una fase di stallo 
istituzionale: mutamenti nelle sfere della rappresentanza politica, dei processi decisionali e della cittadinanza 
sociale‖ financed by the Ministery of Education (PRIN 2007). 
2
 Among these documents there are thirty Euromanifestos of the radical right. 
3
 The countries included in the analysis were the following ones: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and United Kingdom. 
4
 In particular, only two Euromanifestos of the radical right date from 1989, the other Euromanifestos date from 
1994-2004.  
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Table 2 – Euromanifestos that mention the analyzed themes (percentages) 
 
Theme 
Mentioned in  % of Euromanifestos 
 
 All parties  Mainstream parties Radical 
parties 
Membership 88.8 87 95.3 
National action in Europe 77.2 77 78.1 
Foreign policy 71.3 71.7 69.8 
Defense policy 71.4 73.5 64.1 
Immigration policy 
 
51.7 50 57.8 
   Source: INTUNE project, University of Siena, Circap 
 
The analysis moves now to a more in-depth examination of the direction of party positions. 
For this purpose, I applied multinomial logistic regression models for the analysis of the 
content analytic variables drawn from the Euromanifestos. This technique allowed me to 
estimate the likelihood for radical parties to express Eurosceptical positions as compared to 
mainstream parties. Subsequently, within the radical party category I separated left from 
right. The comparison of attitudes between parties of different ideological orientations allows 
us to understand the phenomenon of Euroscepticism comparatively and to insert these 
attitudes within the broader context of inter-party competition and of contestation of the EU 
issue. Precisely, multinomial logistic regression models estimate the likelihood of different 
cases to belong to each category of the dependent variable when compared to a reference 
category. For example, in table 3, the ExpB coefficient estimates the likelihood of each 
category of the dependent variable ‗membership‘ to occur compared to the reference 
category ‗favourable opportunities‘. In other words, the model estimates how likely it is to find 
in the Euromanifestos (of the mainstream and radical parties respectively) ‗no reference‘, a 
‗mixed‘ or a ‗negative‘ evaluation of the country membership, compared to the reference 
category ‗favourable opportunities‘. I found that in their Euromanifestos, radical parties have 
almost eleven times (ExpB=10.75) greater a likelihood to represent membership as a 
negative constraint than to represent it as a positive opportunity. On the contrary, such 
likelihood is almost null (ExpB=0.2) for mainstream parties.
5
 In particular, I found that 70% of 
the Euromanifestos of the radical right (and 64.7% of those of the radical left) expressed a 
negative evaluation of the country membership. Consequently, the expectation of a broad 
Eurosceptism rooted in the radical parties is confirmed by the data. 
  
                                                     
5
 I considered mainstream parties to be those belonging to the following party families: Christian democrats, 
socialists, liberals, conservatives, regionalists (with the exception of the Northern League), greens and some other 
moderate parties on indication of the national experts involved in the research. I categorized Communists, extreme 
left, nationalists and the extreme right as radical parties. 
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Table 3 – Party positions on membership 
EU Membership evaluated as   B Std. Error Exp(B) 
     
Mixed favourable/negative Mainstream parties -.81 .16 .44*** 
 Radical parties 1.25 .56 3.50** 
No reference Mainstream parties -1.38 .20 .25*** 
 Radical parties -.28 .76 .75 
Negative constraints Mainstream parties -1.49 .20 .22*** 
 Radical parties 2.37 .76 10.75*** 
 
Reference category: favourable 
opportunities 
 
 
    

2 
Sig. 
R
2 
N 
148.222 
.000 
.42 
298 
    Note: *** significant at  0.001 level ** significant at 0.01 level 
    Source: INTUNE project, University of Siena, Circap 
 
With this negative evaluation of membership on the side of radical parties follows their strong emphasis 
on the necessity for the national government to oppose decisions at the EU level that could constrain 
the member states. In order to find evidence of this, I analyzed how parties think the national 
government should behave in the EU arena. In table 4, ‗defence/rejection‘ is the reference category. I 
found that mainstream parties are eight times (ExpB=8.18) more likely to express a preference for a 
cooperative behavior, thus for an acquiescent conduct of the national government. Furthermore, they 
are over five times more likely (ExpB=5.63) to prefer the leadership of the national government within 
the EU arena, hence to be in favor of a voice option. In the end, as it was easy to predict, mainstream 
parties are divided on the assertiveness and the role that the national government should have within 
the EU. On the contrary, the category of radical parties is more focused on the ‗defence/rejection‘ 
solution, while the likelihood for the Euromanifestos of these parties to fall in any other category is not 
significant.
6
 However, it is important to highlight the differences in the attitudes of the two extremes. 
The ‗defence/rejection‘ category occurs in 43.3% of Euromanifestos of radical right parties as 
compared to 6.7% of those of the radical left whose most recurrent category (38.2%) is instead that of 
cooperation
7
 (occurring in only 6.7% of Euromanifestos of the radical right). These results show that, 
although Euroscepticism is deeply rooted in the radical parties under the form of a broad attitude, for 
instance when they evaluate country membership, when we break-down the broad stance into more 
specific attitudes we find that Euroscepticism is definitely more pronounced in the radical right. 
  
                                                     
6
 Changing the reference category does not change the result, as radical parties have a tendency to concentrate 
their preference  in the ‗defence/rejection‘ category. 
7
 In particular, Izquierda Unida and Synaspimos are the main advocate of this solution within the radical left. 
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Table 4 – Party positions on national action in the EU 
 
 
The national government should 
prioritize   B Std. Error Exp(B) 
     
No reference Mainstream parties 1.57 .33 4.81*** 
 Radical parties -.40 .34 .66 
Leadership Mainstream parties 1.72 .32 5.63*** 
 Radical parties -.74 .38 .47* 
Cooperation Mainstream parties 2.10 .31 8.18*** 
 Radical parties -.33 .33 .71 
Mixed Mainstream parties -.09 .43 .90 
 Radical parties -3,04 1.02 .04*** 
 
Reference category: defense/rejection     

2 
Sig. 
R
2 
N 
207.827 
.000 
.52 
298 
    Note: *** significant at  0.001 level * significant at 0.05 level  
   Source: INTUNE project, University of Siena, Circap 
 
Moving the analysis to the policy dimension, we find the same pattern. In particular, we find 
the same tendency for attitudes toward foreign and defense policy. In table 5, mainstream 
parties show 9.9 and 9.2 times greater likelihood respectively for the exclusive EU 
competence and a shared EU-national competence, as compared to the reference category 
of the exclusive national competence.  So, mainstream parties are rather divided in terms of 
degree of involvement of the EU in foreign policy, something that could explain the difficulties 
in integrating the ex-Second Pillar of the EU. However, they agree overwhelmingly on some 
kind of involvement of the EU, while they voice a preference for the exclusive national 
competence only very rarely. The same tendency can be found for defense policy (tab. 6) as 
the preference of mainstream parties for the exclusive European competence and for the 
shared EU-national competence is 12.3 and 10.3 times greater than for the reference 
category of exclusive national competence. For both policies, values for the radical parties 
are instead not significant. The reason can be found in the dispersion of their preferences 
across different categories. Dispersion occurs between radical left and radical right, as well 
as across countries. Overall, the preference of radical parties for the exclusive national 
competence exceeds that for any other option. They voice this sovereignist stance in foreign 
and defense policy in 27% and 25% of their Euromanifestos respectively, without any 
particular distinction between left and right. However, somewhat unexpectedly, the share for 
the other categories is also similar. Notably, over time the radical left – but not the radical 
right – becomes more supportive of the EU competence, until a peak in 2004 when 66.6% of 
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the Euromanifestos of the radical left supports the EU competence (either exclusive or 
shared) in foreign policy and 53.9% in defense policy
8
.  
In sum, differences between mainstream and radical parties are remarkable since the EU involvement 
in these two policy areas is much less popular with radical parties. However, only a minority of radical 
parties rejects the EU involvement in principle, while on this issue the radical left has become 
increasingly aligned with mainstream parties over time. In the end, the radical right is the main 
stronghold of opposition against the communitarisation of foreign and defense policy. However, even 
for these parties, Euroscepticism is not absolute. Although integration of these policies deeply 
challenges one of the core values of the radical right, namely the defense of national sovereignty, its 
national components are divided on what is the best level of competence. In some countries, radical 
right parties support some EU competence in foreign and defense policy
9
 as they see the EU as a 
potential barrier against globalization and U.S dominance that they oppose more fiercely: against both 
forces, any national scale action would be powerless, especially from countries of small size or 
reduced strategic power. Ultimately, although at various degrees and certainly more to the left than to 
the right, the EU has acquired some legitimacy as a level of governance even within the programmatic 
supply of radical parties. Euroscepticism in this sphere prevails in the radical right, but as we have 
seen, not unanimously. 
 
Table 5 – Party positions on foreign policy 
 
Favorite level of competence   B Std. Error Exp(B) 
     
No reference Mainstream parties 2.09 .37 8.12*** 
 Radical parties .11 .33 1.11 
Exclusive European Mainstream parties 2.29 .37 9.87*** 
 Radical parties -.26 .36 .76 
Shared European/national Mainstream parties 2.22 .37 9.25*** 
 Radical parties -.19 .36 .59 
 
Reference category: exclusive 
national     

2 
Sig. 
R
2 
N 
285.127 
.000 
.64 
298 
    Note: *** significant at  0.001 level 
    Source: INTUNE project, University of Siena, Circap 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
8
 The German PDS and the Greek Synaspimos were particularly in favour. 
9
 Among radical right parties, the MSI/National Alliance in 1994 in Italy (then coded as mainstream party in the 
following years), the Flemish Vlaams Belang and the Francophone National Front in 2004 in Belgium supported 
the EU involvement in both policies. 
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Table 6 – Party positions on defense policy 
 
Favorite level of competence  B Std. Error Exp(B) 
     
No reference Mainstream parties 2.16 .39 8.71*** 
 Radical parties 0.36 .32 1.43 
Exclusive European Mainstream parties 2.50 .39 12.28*** 
 Radical parties -.06 .35 .93 
Shared European/national Mainstream parties 2.33 .39 10.28*** 
 Radical parties -.47 .40 .62 
 
Reference category: exclusive 
national 
     

2 
Sig. 
R
2 
N 
296.252 
.000 
.65 
298 
    Note: *** significant at  0.001 level 
    Source: INTUNE project, University of Siena, Circap 
 
We move now to the analysis of immigration policy. On the one hand, the likelihood of a 
preference for the exclusive EU competence or the shared EU-national competence on the 
side of mainstream parties is almost eight (ExpB=7.75) and five (ExpB=5.13) times greater 
than it is for exclusive national competence (reference category). However, a lack of 
reference to immigration issues is the most likely possibility for mainstream parties 
(ExpB=14.38). On the other hand, the preferences of radical parties are again dispersed 
among different categories. Even more than for foreign and defense policy, such dispersion 
is to be attributed mainly to the radical left. As a matter of fact, the position of radical right 
parties is more univocal as 42.9% of their Euromanfestos support the exclusive national 
competence in immigration policy. It is evidence of the fact that radical right parties make 
their programmatic supply on this issue very distinctive from that of the other parties and 
characterize their stance along the lines of a more openly nationalistic posture. Although less 
than half of the Euromanifestos of the radical right really favor the most nationalistic solution, 
the other more recurrent category is the no reference one, especially in the new member 
states
10
, while a preference for the EU involvement in the immigration policy is only residual 
among radical right parties.
11
 
  
                                                     
10
 For example, in 2004, the Lithuanian National Centre Party and Party of National Progress, and the League of 
Polish Families did not make any reference to the issue of the favourite level of competence in immigration policy. 
11
 Only the Italian MSI-National Alliance in 1994 and the German Republicans in 1999-2004 supported the 
involvement of the EU in this policy. 
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Table 7 – Party positions on immigration policy 
 
Favorite level of competence   B Std. Error Exp(B) 
     
No reference Mainstream parties 2.67 0.37 14.38*** 
 Radical parties 0.52 0.32 1.69 
Exclusive European Mainstream parties 2.05 0.38 7.75*** 
 Radical parties -0.47 0.40 0.62 
Shared European/national Mainstream parties 1.63 0.39 5.13*** 
 Radical parties -0.58 0.42 0.56 
 
Reference category: exclusive 
national 
   

2 
P-value 
R
2 
N 
219.542 
.000 
.54 
298  
    Note: *** significant at  0.001 level 
    Source: INTUNE project, University of Siena, Circap 
 
To conclude this part of the analysis, I can summarize that I found confirmation of the fact 
that the radical right is the main stronghold of party-based Euroscepticism. However, this 
attitude is broad more than it is absolute, and most importantly, it is not univocal across the 
European countries. Although still very criticized, the EU has acquired legitimacy by radical 
right parties in some member states where its role as a policy-maker is relatively welcome. 
The very existence of the EU is therefore not questioned by these parties. The 
Euroscepticism of the radical right is still quite strident, especially if one compares their 
attitudes to those of mainstream parties and even of radical left parties whose opposition 
against the EU has become more nuanced over time. Still, it would be difficult to talk about a 
principled opposition of the radical right against the EU when parties are so divided about the 
role the EU should play in the European system of governance. 
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III.  How Radical Right Parties Vote in the European 
Parliament 
The paper now moves to the analysis of the institutional behavior of the MEPs of the radical 
right. Specifically, I will examine whether they vote cohesively within the EP. As a matter of 
fact, in the previous section it has already been shown that the programmatic supply of the 
radical right is characterized by some common positions, as well as by some important 
differences. We now investigate whether these differences also translate into a diverse 
behavior of radical right MEPs within the EP. In addition, this part of the analysis allows us to 
shed a light on the problem of the level of coherence existing between the protest-based 
rhetoric of radical right parties in the election campaign (however mitigated by specific policy 
positions that, as we have seen, are not so much opposed to the EU) and their institutional 
behavior after the elections. 
For the analysis, I have selected the EP group ‗Independence/Democracy‘ (IND/DEM) of the 
2004-2009 legislature. The group was created in 2004, when parties from the Eurosceptical 
‗Europe of Democracy and Diversities‘ group made an alliance with some parties from the 
new member states. The most important parties of IND/DEM were the following
12
: the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), the League of Polish Families, the Italian Northern League 
(suspended in 2006 and then expelled from the group after the scandal of the t-shirt worn by 
the party member Calderoli showing anti-Islamic cartoons), and the Movement for France. 
Additionally, some MEPs from Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands and 
Sweden also took part in the group. However, other important radical right parties such as 
the French Front National and the Vlaams Belang did not join IND/DEM and decided instead 
to belong to the ‗Non Attached‘ group. By the end of the legislature, especially after the 
expulsion of the Northern League, the group could rely on just 2.8 per cent of the seats in the 
EP. Definitely, this lack of unity within the EP of radical right parties gives evidence of a lack 
of cohesion of their intents and strategy. So the argument of whether they could be 
considered a genuine party family finds negative evidence here. At least, these parties are 
not transnationally organized as most other party families are and this, in turn, creates an 
impediment for the establishment of greater coherence of action within this political area. 
This lack of transnational organization also creates a problem for the analysis carried in this 
paper: due to dispersion of the radical right MEPs in various groups, any result on IND/DEM 
only partially represents the radical right as a whole. Furthermore, the empirical referent 
considered in the two parts of the analysis is not identical, as the Euromanifesto data 
examined in the previous section referred to a larger number of radical right parties than the 
data on the voting behavior of the MEPs of Independence/Democracy. However, I will show 
that in spite of these limitations, it is still possible to produce some considerations and to 
advance some tentative conclusions about the phenomena under analysis. 
                                                     
12
 The group ceased to exist in 2009 when some of its components united with the remnants of the ‗Union for a 
Europe of Nations‘ group to create a new group called ‗Europe of Freedom and Democracy‘. 
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The first problem that I am going to explore concerns the internal cohesion within IND/DEM. 
For this purpose, in table 8 I have reported a measurement elaborated by Hix and Noury of 
the internal cohesion of the EP groups in the period 2004-2009 based on the roll-call votes 
(all data in this section are available on-line at http://www.votewatch.eu).
13
 It clearly emerged 
that within the EP context, IND/DEM was the group with lower internal cohesion, 
comparatively as low as the Non-Attached group. To be more precise, their level of cohesion 
was about half the average level (0.8) of all party groups with the exclusion of IND/DEM and 
the Non-Attached. On the other extreme of the political spectrum, the European United 
Left/Nordic Green Left group (GUE-NGL) showed a level of internal cohesion in line with the 
above mentioned average. Hence, the radical right was internally divided along its national 
components much more than any other group of the EP was. Indeed, we only need to recall 
that some ideological diversity also emerged in the Euromanifesto analysis, but strikingly 
wide divisions emerged in the way the radical right MEPs voted in the EP. It is interesting to 
note that the low level of internal cohesion of the IND/DEM is also confirmed when we 
disaggregate votes by policy areas, as scores tend to be close to the overall cohesion rate: 
 0.5 for budgetary policy, economics, foreign and defense policy, culture and 
education; 
 0.4 for justice and home affairs, unemployment, social policy, development, 
transportation, tourism, fishery, equal opportunities; 
 0.3 for agriculture, environment, industry, energy, research, internal market. 
 
Precisely, among the parties in this group, the UKIP voted against the party line one out of 
three times and the League of Polish Families one out of five.
14
 Hence, among the larger 
parties that formed the group, the latter was the one that contributed more to determine the 
party line. However, its defection rate of one fifth should not be ignored and it is the sign of a 
rather undisciplined conduct and lack of leadership within the political group. Since we 
registered an extremely low level of internal cohesion, this could not be explained by the 
defections of the British and the Polish MEPS alone. It follows that the other MEPs of the 
group representing even smaller parties have all together defected the party line more 
frequently. 
  
                                                     
13
For each vote, the group cohesion was calculated using the index of Rice: (Y-N)/(Y+N+A), where Y = nr. of votes 
in favour, N = nr. of votes against and A = nr. of abstentions. The cohesion rate of each group is the mean score of 
all roll-call votes. 
14
 The other parties of IND/DEM have less than five representatives  in the group. It is not possible to calculate 
loyalty scores for national groups with less than five MEPs. A national group is made up by MEPs from the same 
member state who join the same European Political Group. 
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Table 8 – Cohesion index of the EP political groups (2004-2009) 
 
 EPP PSE ALDE UEN Greens GUE-
NGL 
IND/ 
DEM 
NA 
Cohesion index  0.88 0.91 0.89 0.76 0.91 0.85 0.47 0.44 
    Source: http://www.votewatch.eu 
 
Having established that radical right parties within the EP are not cohesive, it is now 
interesting to analyze how they behave vis a vis the other parties. One underlying 
characteristic of radical right parties is indeed their anti-system rhetoric. For this reason, they 
have alternatively been labeled as populist, extreme right, fascist, or protest-based 
organizations (Mudde 2007, 29). Indeed, at the national level, they often reject the system 
from its constitutional foundations. At the same time, the system tends to exclude them; at 
the national level several institutional barriers such as those coming from the electoral rules 
have been built in order to marginalize these parties. So, with only some exceptions and 
contrary to mainstream parties, radical right parties are usually rooted on the ground of the 
society more than they are in public office. As a consequence, they are also largely excluded 
from public resources - consisting mostly of state financing - that are instead largely 
available to cartel parties (Katz & Mair1995). Hence, at the national level radical right parties 
can successfully represent themselves as separate from the system and their distinctiveness 
as a form of non-collusion and disinterestedness. They can do so especially when they 
criticize the state elites, one of the main arguments in their rhetoric. What happens then 
when we shift the focus of the analysis to the EU system? Is their anti-system protest also 
transferred to the EU level? We found that the Euromanfestos are rich in criticisms to the 
country membership in the EU. (table 3). Now we analyze whether such a broad stance also 
corresponds to an institutional practice of outsiders within the EP. 
In reality, the tendency of IND/DEM, as well as of the radical left, to a participatory and even 
collusive behavior within the EP should not be underestimated (table 9). Although the 
number of times this group was part of a majority in the EP was the lowest among all party 
groups, the total rate (46.2 per cent) is still considerable and certainly higher than we could 
expect from any anti-system force. Hence, in almost half of the cases, IND/DEM was part of 
a parliamentary majority. To be sure, their votes only converged with large majorities 
composed of at least two large parties (the European People‘s Party [EPP], the European 
Socialist Party [PSE], or the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe [ALDE]). 
Therefore, their vote was not necessary to build minimum winning coalitions, and 
consequently their blackmail potential and coalition power remained very limited even when 
they joined a majority. Just as at the national level (where only few exceptions can be found 
in countries such as Austria and Italy), also in the EP the radical right is largely non-influent 
for the formation of coalitions. For this reason, it is surprising that they voted along the lines 
of a parliamentary majority so many times. Especially when we consider that only a fraction 
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of the votes of IND/DEM converged with those of parliamentary majorities of centre-right 
leaning parties (either EPP, ALDE or Union for the Europe of Nations [UEN]) and could 
therefore be justified on the bases of some common ideological inclinations. In most cases, 
the majority also included (to a greater or lesser degree) the PSE, the Greens, and the GUE-
NGL. An in-depth analysis of the contents of the bills passed with the support of IND/DEM 
would be necessary in order to discover the motivations for their institutional behavior – one 
that could certainly not be labeled as the behavior of outsiders. It is, however, a research 
goal that goes beyond the scope of the analysis presented in this paper, but one that future 
research should consider in order to shed light on this interesting phenomenon concerning 
the institutional behavior of the public office of radical right parties. 
 
Table 9 – Times when EP political groups were part of a winning majority 
(percentages) 
 
 PPE PSE ALDE UEN Greens GUE-
NGL 
IND/ 
DEM 
Part of a winning 
majority 
86 81.2 85.7 75.3 60.2 51.9 46.2 
 
   Source: http://www.votewatch.eu 
 
Certainly, convergence with the EP majority is also due to the consensual nature of the EP 
where decisions are often lowest common denominator agreements among the different 
forces that are represented in this assembly. However, even from this perspective, we could 
not avoid defining the strategy of the radical right in the EP as either one of voice, or one of 
acquiescence. Being that their votes converged with those of large coalitions and were 
therefore not necessary to form a majority, we can hypothesize that the blackmail potential of 
IND/DEM was really limited on those occasions, as well as their capacity to influence the 
final outcome in the decision-making process. Hence, their strategy should really be 
characterized by acquiescence more than by a real capacity to voice their preferences and 
force the other parties to compromise with them. In the end, it seems that radical right parties 
are rather maximalists on the EU in their rhetoric (although even in this respect the analysis 
of Euromanifestos has shown that in some countries they accept the EU as a level of 
governance) but they tend to exclude the most maximalist option of exit when they operate 
within the EU institutions. This result is also confirmed by the attendance rate (82.5%) to the 
plenary sessions of the EP by the MEPs of IND/DEM, a rate that is very close to the average 
of the other (mostly mainstream) groups (84.6%). As we have seen, a vote with the majority 
corresponds to this high attendance rate in almost half of the cases and a vote against (or 
abstention) in the remaining part. Only when they vote against the majority do they express 
their protest against the main groups, usually by voting with parties on the extremes of both 
left and right (Hagemann 2009). It is evident that radical right parties collect votes in the 
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European elections based on a broad Eurosceptical stance (with policy specific positions 
that are sometimes not as much Eurosceptical). However, once in the EP, it is important to 
note that they express their dissent making use of the rules of the game, voting with the 
opposition more than the other forces do, but voting almost as much with the majority. If 
these figures were known by the larger public, it would not be surprising if the protest-based 
electorate of these parties felt dissatisfied with their institutional conduct. 
It seems that the public office of these parties is way less anti-EU than the political discourse 
of their central office. There may be several explanations for this behavior. On the one hand, 
there might be a search for legitimacy on the part of these parties. They want to participate in 
the decision-making process and they want to be considered credible coalition partners. This 
could be achieved more easily in an assembly such as the EP where coalitions are formed 
on an issue-by-issue basis, rather than following pre-arranged coalition agreements between 
either the groups or the national delegations. On the other hand, radical right parties might 
be aware of the advantages which come with representation in the EP. They can have a 
public office that is often lacking at the national level where they are frequently excluded 
from institutional representation due to electoral rules, the impact of strategic voting in first 
order elections, or the marginalization by mainstream parties. The advantages of 
representation in the EP are not negligible, especially for small radical parties. Notably, from 
a financial point of view, parties represented in the EP have access to public financing, which 
has become so relevant for the survival of parties in contemporary times (Katz & Mair 1995, 
Aucante & Dézé 2008). Such funds come directly from the EU budget, in order to allow the 
organizational functioning of the EP. As well, they come from the national budget under the 
form of ordinary contributions or reimbursements of the electoral expenses. Ultimately, either 
directly or indirectly, the EP is doing a lot for the financial and organizational survival of small 
radical parties. Alternatively, we could look for other non-strategic explanations of the 
institutional behavior of radical right MEPs. Just like  any other actor who is inserted in the 
European decision-making system, they become gradually socialized to the practices and 
principles of the EU governance, through forms of interaction oriented toward consensualism 
that in the long term create a sense of trust and identification with the institution and with the 
system at large (Schimmelfennig 2000). This could also explain why the radical right often 
takes a more pragmatic stance in the EP than the rhetoric of their central office would 
anticipate. None of these potential explanations can be examined in-depth in this paper, but 
certainly knowledge on the radical right, as well as on EU politics, would greatly benefit from 
the analysis of these possible determinants of the party conduct in the EP. In the meanwhile, 
although it is not yet possible to talk about a radical right in the EU that is anti-establishment 
but open to government it seems there is already enough evidence to talk about a radical 
right that is anti-establishment and part of the system.  
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IV.  Conclusion 
The analysis that was carried out in this paper shows that the radical right is the party block 
characterized by the lowest levels of internal cohesion in the whole context of the European 
party families. This finding holds true both in the analysis of ideology that was examined 
through party Euromanifestos, and in that of institutional behavior shown by the data on the 
roll-call votes of the MEPs. The Euroscepticism of the radical right is well-known, however 
after an accurate analysis, it showed that it is discontinuous and lacks a common vision 
across its national party components. If this diversity was verified not only with respect to the 
European issue but to other issues as well, there would be reason to question whether the 
radical right could be defined as a party family, or if it should instead be considered a 
disordered aggregation of national parties of erratic ideological positions.  
The analysis of two different arenas, namely a second-order national electoral arena and the 
EP institutional arena, very clearly show that the radical right in Europe is divided into a 
plethora of stances and policy preferences and by reciprocal enmities and political 
antagonism. From the analyses, it emerged that their ideological foundations, programmatic 
supply and organizational features are so diverse that it even seems hard to group them 
under a distinctive party family name. This finding reinforces Mudde‘s (2007) argument about 
the necessity to classify parties that common wisdom tends to pinpoint within the radical right 
with more accuracy. Certainly, this paper shows that in Europe, a famille spirituelle grouping 
the main parties of this political area is, in reality, hardly discernible and even the use of the 
concept of party family could be incorrect when referring to the radical right. 
At the same time, a clear tendency toward a greater pragmatism and moderation of the 
MEPs of the radical right emerged in the paper as compared to the party programmatic 
announcements. Although radical right parties represent a source of opposition within the 
EP, some of them also take part in parliamentary majorities in almost the same proportion. 
This phenomenon shows that there is a remarkable distance between the central office and 
the public office of these parties, at least in terms of coherence between the statements of 
the former and the institutional conduct of the latter. Whether this is a conscious, or even a 
strategic game played by these parties, is a question that this paper has not addressed. 
Certainly, their conduct raises many questions that future research may address. Overall, the 
party public office in the EP is more institutionalized, more inserted in the legislative process 
and even more collusive with the other parties of both sides of the political spectrum than the 
rhetoric and statements of central office makes the public believe. The paper documented 
the ambivalence between a more Eurosceptical party central office and a more collusive EP 
public office. This conflicting valence between central office and public office could be a sign 
of difficulty for these parties in playing the role of legislators and, at the same time, represent 
a protest-based electorate. Especially in an assembly like the EP where there is not a clear 
government to oppose and so the temptation to collude with the other parties can be 
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amplified. Whether or not this phenomenon limits the capacity of radical right parties in the 
EP to represent their electorate - as they fail to deliver firm opposition against the 
mainstream parties - is an interesting problem. At the same time, however, the level of 
information of citizens about the activities in the EP is so low that a disappointing behavior of 
the MEPs would hardly result in a sanction vote in the following elections. So, it was 
interesting to document that in an assembly characterized by limited popular scrutiny as is 
the EP, the conduct of some radical right parties is not one of principled opposition, it is 
actually less extreme than many would expect. 
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